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I. The determination view 
 
A basic tenet of contemporary semantics is that the meaning of a sentence 
determines its truth conditions. That determination of truth conditions by 
linguistic meaning can be more or less direct. In non-indexical cases the 
meaning of the sentence directly determines (and can even be equated 
with) its truth conditions. The sentence 'Snow is white' means that, and is 
true if and only if, snow is white. To give the meaning of such a sentence is 
to give its truth conditions. When the sentence is indexical, the situation is 
more complex. The sentence has truth conditions only 'with respect to 
context'. The sentence 'I am English' uttered by John is true if and only if 
John is English; uttered by Paul, it is true if and only if Paul is English, etc. 
Still, the truth conditions, in each context, are determined by the meaning 
of the sentence (with respect to the context). The meaning of 'I am English' 
determines that, if that sentence is uttered by a, then it is true iff a is 
English. 
 The thesis that meaning determines truth conditions can be dubbed 
the 'Determination View'. It goes largely unquestioned in contemporary 
analytic philosophy (as it did in early analytic philosophy). Fifty years ago 
the situation was different. So-called 'ordinary language philosophers' 
rejected the Determination View.1 But ordinary language philosophy has 
suffered a spectacular loss of influence over the last thirty years and is 
nowadays no more than an object of scorn and caricature. The interest 
                                           
1 Amongst 'ordinary language philosophers' I include Wittgenstein and Waismann as 
well as Oxford philosophers (Austin, Strawson, etc.). 
aroused by Wittgenstein and his work has not, paradoxically, ceased to 
grow even though the current of ideas from which he is inseparable has 
undergone the aforesaid decline. But Wittgenstein's more or less intentional 
obscurity, even if contributing to his impact and popularity, limits the 
effective dissemination of his ideas. 
 Among contemporary theorists, only a few resist the Determination 
View. John Searle is one of them. He holds that linguistic meaning 
radically under-determines truth conditions. According to Searle, even 
after the reference or semantic value of all the indexical expressions 
contained in a sentence, including tenses, has been contextually fixed, we 
still cannot specify a state of affairs s such that the sentence (with respect 
to those contextual assignments) is true if and only if s obtains. For every 
candidate, i.e. for every such state of affairs, Searle shows that we can 
imagine a context with respect to which the sentence would not, or not 
necessarily, be considered as true, even though the relevant state of affairs 
obtained. That is so because in specifying the state of affairs in question we 
take many things for granted. If we get rid of those tacit assumptions (by 
imagining a weird context in which they do not hold) the state of affairs we 
have specified no longer corresponds to the intuitive truth conditions of the 
utterance. 
 
II. Background assumptions 
 
There are many things that we take for granted both in speaking and in 
interpreting the utterances of others. Among those things we take for 
granted, some are articulated in the sentence itself: they are the 
'presuppositions' of the sentence. Thus if I say that John has stopped 
smoking, I presuppose that John smoked before, in virtue of the 
appropriateness conditions of the verb 'to stop'. But there are also things we 
take for granted which are in no way articulated in the sentence itself. 
Searle calls them 'background assumptions'. For example, 
 
Suppose I go into the restaurant and order a meal. Suppose I say, 
speaking literally, 'Bring me a steak with fried potatoes.' (...) I take it 
for granted that they will not deliver the meal to my house, or to my 
place of work. I take it for granted that the steak will not be encased in 
concrete, or petrified. It will not be stuffed into my pockets or spread 
over my head. But none of these assumptions was made explicit in the 
literal utterance. (Searle 1992: 180) 
 Though unarticulated, those assumptions contribute to determining the 
intuitive conditions of satisfaction (obedience conditions, truth conditions, 
etc.) of the utterance. The order 'Bring me a steak with fried potatoes' does 
not count as satisfied if the steak is delivered, encased in concrete, to the 
customer's house. It is mutually manifest to both the hearer and the speaker 
that the speaker intends the ordered meal to be placed in front of him on the 
restaurant table he is sitting at, etc. Though not explicitly said, that is 
clearly part of what is meant. Yet one does not want to say that that aspect 
of utterance meaning is conveyed indirectly or nonliterally (as when one 
says something and means something else). The utterance 'Bring me a 
steak with fried potatoes' is fully literal. It is a property of literal and 
serious utterances that their conditions of satisfaction systematically 
depend upon unstated background assumptions. 
 Another example given by Searle involves the word 'cut' in (literal 
utterances of) sentences such as 'Bill cut the grass' and 'Sally cut the cake'. 
The word 'cut' is not ambiguous, Searle says, yet it makes quite different 
contributions to the truth conditions of the utterance in the two cases. That 
is because background assumptions play a role in fixing satisfaction-
conditions, and different background assumptions underlie the use of 'cut' 
in connection with grass and cakes respectively. We assume that grass is 
cut in a certain way, and cakes in another way. The assumed way of cutting 
finds its way into the utterance's truth conditions: 
 
Though the occurrence of the word "cut" is literal in [both] 
utterances..., and though the word is not ambiguous, it determines 
different sets of truth conditions for the different sentences. The sort 
of thing that constitutes cutting the grass is quite different from, e.g., 
the sort of thing that constitutes cutting a cake. One way to see this is 
to imagine what constitutes obeying the order to cut something. If 
someone tells me to cut the grass and I rush out and stab it with a 
knife, or if I am ordered to cut the cake and I run over it with a 
lawnmower, in each case I will have failed to obey the order. That is 
not what the speaker meant by his literal and serious utterance of the 
sentence. (Searle 1980: 222-223) 
 
Examples can be multiplied at will. Searle convincingly shows that 
background assumptions such as these have the following properties: (i) for 
every utterance, there is an indefinite number of them; (ii) if we manipulate 
them by imagining weird situations in which they do not hold (e.g. a 
situation in which steaks are standardly encased in concrete, or a situation 
in which grass is sliced into strips and sold to customers who want a lawn 
in a hurry), the intuitive truth conditions of the utterance are affected; (iii) 
we cannot make them explicit in the sentence itself without bringing in 
further background assumptions involved in the interpretation of the extra 
descriptive material. These properties entail that the Determination View 
must be given up. Truth-conditions depend not only upon the meaning of 
the sentence and the contextual parameters relevant to the interpretation of 
indexicals, but also upon what Searle calls 'the Background'. Change the 
background, you change (or possibly destroy) the truth conditional content 
of the utterance. 
 
III. Contextualism 
 
As I mentioned above, ordinary language philosophers, from Wittgenstein 
to Strawson, also rejected the Determination View. Their emphasis was on 
speech rather than language. As Searle writes, 
 
[Early analytic philosophers] treat the elements of language — words, 
sentences, propositions — as things that represent or things that are 
true or false, etc., apart from any actions or intentions of speakers and 
hearers. The elements of the language, not the actions and intentions 
of the speakers are what count. In the late thirties and especially after 
the Second world War these assumptions came to be vigourously 
challenged, especially by Wittgenstein. (Searle 1971: 6) 
 
According to the alternative view put forward by Wittgenstein, Austin, and 
their followers, it is not natural language sentences, not even sentences 
'with respect to context', which have truth conditions, but full-blooded 
speech acts — meaningful actions performed by rational agents. That view 
I call 'contextualism'. 
 Two purported refutations of contextualism were offered in the 
sixties, by Grice and Geach respectively. One of the reasons why 
contextualism has lost grounds is that those refutations have been generally 
considered as successful. Another reason for the demise of contextualism is 
the striking success of the intellectual entreprise known as formal 
semantics. Formal semantics is based on the Determination View, and its 
success seems to give the lie to contextualism. 
 In this chapter I will not deal with Grice's and Geach's arguments 
against contextualism;2 nor will I consider whether or not it is possible to 
reconcile contextualism with the project of giving a systematic semantics 
for natural language. I will only be concerned with Searle's critique of the 
Determination View, and its relation (both historical and theoretical) to 
contextualism. 
 Even though he was trained in Oxford under Austin and Strawson, 
Searle himself was not a contextualist when he wrote Speech Acts. To be 
sure, he held that "the unit of communication is not, as has generally been 
supposed, the symbol, word or sentence, or even the token of the symbol, 
word or sentence, but rather the production or issuance of the symbol or 
word or sentence in the performance of the speech act" (Searle 1965: 221-
222; 1969: 16). At the same time, however, he issued warnings such as the 
following: 
 
A commonplace of recent philosophizing about language has been the 
distinction between sentences and the speech acts performed in the 
utterances of those sentences. Valuable as this distinction is, there has 
also been a tendency to overemphasize it. (Searle 1968: 153) 
 
It is possible to distinguish at least two strands in contemporary work 
in the philosophy of language — one which concentrates on the uses 
of expressions in speech situations and one which concentrates on the 
meaning of sentences. Practitioners of these two approaches 
sometimes talk as if they were inconsistent, and at least some 
encouragement is given to the view that they are inconsistent by the 
fact that historically they have been associated with inconsistent views 
about meaning. (...) But although historically there have been sharp 
disagreements between practitioners of these two approaches, it is 
important to realize that the two approaches... are complementary and 
not competing. (Searle 1969: 18) 
 
The main reason why Searle kept his distances from the contextualism of 
his teachers was his acceptance of a basic principle he put forward under 
the name of 'Principle of Expressibility'. 
 
                                           
2 For a critique of Grice's argument against contextualism, see Recanati 1994. 
IV. The Principle of Expressibility 
 
In general, the content of a speech act — what the speaker communicates 
and the hearer understands — cannot be equated with the content of the 
sentence uttered in performing that speech act. That is due to many factors. 
(i) The uttered sentence is often elliptical, indeterminate or ambiguous even 
though what the speaker communicates by uttering the sentence in context 
is perfectly determinate and univocal. (ii) The referring expressions used 
by the speaker do not, in general, uniquely determine what the speaker is 
referring to: appeal to speaker's intentions is necessary to fix the reference 
of, say, demonstratives pronouns etc. (iii) Beside what she says, there are 
many things that the speaker conveys implicitly or nonliterally by her 
utterance, as in indirect speech acts, irony and metaphor. The three factors 
result in a gap between literal sentence meaning and speaker's utterance 
meaning. But that gap can always be closed: that is the gist of the Principle 
of Expressibility, according to which whatever can be meant can be said. 
In principle if not in fact, it is always possible to utter a fully explicit 
sentence, that is, a sentence whose linguistic meaning exactly corresponds 
to, and uniquely determines, the force-and-content of the speech act one is 
performing. It follows that "a study of the meaning of sentences is not in 
principle distinct from a study of speech acts. Properly construed, they are 
the same study" (Searle 1969: 18). 
 Interpreted at face value, the Principle of Expressibility is 
incompatible with contextualism. According to contextualism, the sort of 
content which utterances have (in virtue of the speech acts they serve to 
perform) can never be fully encoded into a sentence; hence it will never be 
the case that the sentence itself expresses that content in virtue solely of the 
conventions of the language. Sentences, by themselves, do not have 
determinate contents. What gives them the determinate contents they have 
(in context) is the fact that they are used in performing meaningful actions. 
In brief, contextualism says that the gap between sentence meaning and 
speaker's meaning can never be closed; while the Principle of 
Expressibility says it can always be closed. A consequence of the Principle 
of Expressibility, Searle says, is that "cases where the speaker does not say 
exactly what he means — the principal kinds of cases of which are 
nonliteralness, vagueness, ambiguity, and incompleteness — are not 
theoretically essential to linguistic communication" (Searle 1969: 20). 
According to contextualism, however, the under-determination of 
communicated content by linguistic meaning is an essential feature of 
linguistic communication. 
 Just as it is incompatible with contextualism, the Principle of 
Expressibility seems incompatible with Searle's findings about 
background-dependence. For Searle, as much as for Austin or 
Wittgenstein, linguistic meaning essentially under-determines 
communicated content. As we have seen, it is impossible to make the 
background assumptions against which an utterance is interpreted explicit, 
first because there is an indefinite number of such assumptions, and second 
because one cannot make them explicit without bringing in further 
background assumptions against which the extra descriptive material is 
interpreted. It follows that the content communicated by an utterance 
cannot be fully encoded into the sentence. 
 Yet Searle has explicitly denied that background phenomena 
threaten the Principle of Expressibility. In 'Literal Meaning', he writes: 
"There is nothing in the thesis of the relativity of literal meaning which is 
inconsistent with the Principle of Expressibility, the principle that whatever 
can be meant can be said" (Searle 1979: 134). How are we to make sense 
of that denial? 
 
V. Expressibility and Effability 
 
Searle's Principle is incompatible with contextualism and the thesis of 
background-dependence when interpreted at face-value. But Searle's 
formulations are vague, and it is possible, if somewhat strained, to 
distinguish several possible interpretations for the Principle. 
 On the strongest, and most natural, interpretation — that which I 
took for granted so far — Searle's Principle of Expressibility is equivalent 
to Katz's Principle of Effability (Katz 1972: 18-24). Katz defines the 
(grammatical) meaning of a sentence as the meaning it has in the 'null 
context'; and he says that what the speaker means by uttering a sentence S 
in a context C (the 'utterance meaning' of S) can always be made explicit as 
the 'grammatical meaning' of an alternative sentence S' that the speaker 
might have uttered (Principle of Effability). Katz says his Principle "was 
propounded in somewhat different form by... Searle"3 in passages such as 
the following: 
 
                                           
3 Katz 1978: 209. 
If you ask me "Are you going to the movies?" I may respond by 
saying "Yes" but, as is clear from the context, what I mean is "Yes, I 
am going to the movies", not "Yes, it is a fine day" or "Yes, we have 
no bananas". Similarly, I might say "I'll come" and mean it as a 
promise to come, i.e., mean it as I would mean "I promise that I will 
come", if I were uttering that sentence and meaning literally what I 
say. In such cases, even though I do not say exactly what I mean, it is 
always possible for me to do so — if there is any possibility that the 
hearer might not understand me, I may do so. (Searle 1969: 19) 
 
 One possible difference between Searle's and Katz's respective 
principle lies in Katz's appeal to the notion of 'null context' in 
characterizing grammatical meaning (a notion which Searle later 
criticized). Where Katz invokes the distinction between grammatical 
meaning thus characterized and utterance meaning, Searle appeals to a 
vaguer distinction between 'sentence meaning' and 'intended speaker 
meaning'. Not only is that distinction vague, it is ambiguous in Searle's 
writings (Recanati 1987: 255-6). In 'Austin on locutionary and 
Illocutionary Acts', Searle says that sense and reference are two "of the 
aspects... in which intended speaker-meaning may go beyond literal 
sentence-meaning" (Searle 1968: 149). Here Searle presumably identifies 
literal sentence meaning with the linguistic, 'determinable' meaning of the 
sentence-type, and intended speaker meaning with what the speaker says in 
uttering this sentence (cf. Forguson, 1973: 179). That is more or less the 
same distinction as Katz's distinction between grammatical meaning and 
utterance meaning, or Austin's distinction between 'phatic' meaning and 
'rhetic' meaning. But in 'Indirect Speech Acts' (and again in 'Metaphor'), 
what Searle calls 'sentence meaning' is what the speaker literally says (by 
uttering the sentence in context), and what he calls 'speaker's utterance 
meaning' is what the speaker actually conveys or communicates (which 
may, and typically does, go beyond or otherwise diverge from what is 
said). Table 1 (from Recanati 1980: 206) summarizes Searle's ambiguous 
use of the sentence meaning/speaker's meaning distinction. 
 
 Linguistic 
meaning of the 
sentence type 
what is literally 
said by uttering 
the sentence in 
context 
what is thereby 
communicated 
Searle 1968 sentence 
meaning1 
speaker's 
meaning1 
 
Searle 1975  sentence 
meaning2 
speaker's 
meaning2 
 
Table 1 
 
 Given that ambiguity, it is tempting to substantiate Searle's claim 
that the Principle of Expressibility is consistent with his later findings by 
interpreting the Principle as follows: 
 
The gap between sentence meaning2 and speaker's meaning2 can 
always be closed. In other words, what is implied or indirectly 
conveyed can always be said literally or directly conveyed. But what 
the sentence says — its literal content (sentence meaning2) — can still 
be treated as context-relative and background-dependent. 
 
On that interpretation of the Principle of Expressibility, it is no longer 
entailed that the content of every speech act can be fully encoded into the 
linguistic meaning of a sentence type.  
 That interpretation of the Principle of Expressibility is clearly not 
what Searle intended when he wrote the relevant passages in his early 
works, however. It is not only nonliteralness, but all cases of divergence 
between sentence meaning and speaker utterance meaning, including (inter 
alia) 'vagueness, ambiguity, and incompleteness', which he says are not 
theoretically essential to linguistic communication, in virtue of the 
Principle of Expressibility. There does not seem to be any significant 
difference between Searle's Principle of Expressibility and Katz's Principle 
of Effability in that respect. In particular, there is no reason to think that 
Searle would have disapproved of anything in the following passage in 
which Katz talks about the divergence between grammatical meaning and 
utterance meaning: 
 
Given that the utterance meaning of a sentence S can be expressed as 
the grammatical meaning of another sentence S', why isn't our 
performance mechanism designed to use S' in the first place? What 
purpose is served by having it produce S and depend on information 
about the context to supply the hearers with part of the utterance 
meaning of S? One function performed by such a mechanism is to 
increase our repertoire of verbal behavior by permitting us to speak 
nonliterally. Its principal function, however, is that it allows speakers 
to make use of contextual features to speak far more concisely than 
otherwise. Imagine how lengthy utterances would be if everything we 
wanted to express had to be spelled out explicitly in the grammar of 
our sentences. Pragmatics saves us from this wasteful verbosity. Thus 
instead of using sentences like (1), we can, on occasion, use sentences 
like (2) 
(1) The man who just asked the stupid question about the relation 
betwen the mental and the physical has, thank God, left the room 
(2) Thank God, he's gone 
(Katz 1977: 19-20) 
 
VI. Expressibility and indexicality 
 
It is ironic that Katz used the 'Thank God' example, for many years before 
(in 1959) Arthur Prior had published an article entitled 'Thank Goodness 
that's over', in order to support the opposite conclusion: that there are 
sentences whose content cannot, even 'in principle', be made fully explicit 
in a context-independent manner: 
 
One says, e.g. 'Thank goodness that's over', and not only is this, when 
said, quite clear without any date appended, but it says something 
which it is impossible that any use of a tenseless copula with a date 
should convey. (Prior 1959: 84; emphasis mine) 
 
In contrast to Prior, Katz insists that reliance on contextual clues can be 
dispensed with, in principle if not in fact. That follows from the Principle 
of Effability, and it seems to follow from the Principle of Expressibility as 
well. Yet Searle, contrary to Katz, does not say so explicitly. He expresses 
no firm views on these matters but seems to oscillate between two 
positions. 
 On the one hand Searle allows that one way of making explicit who 
one means by e.g. the pronoun 'he' is to demonstrate the referent — to 
point to him. The ability to provide a demonstrative identification of the 
referent in context counts as satisfying the Principle of Expressibility, he 
says, just as much as the ability to provide a description such as 'The man 
who just asked the stupid question about the relation betwen the mental and 
the physical'. 
 
Applied to the present case of definite reference, [the Principle of 
Expressibility] amounts to saying that whenever it is true that a 
speaker means a particular object... it must also be true that he can say 
exactly which object it is that he means. (...) A limiting case of saying 
is saying which involves showing; that is, a limiting case of 
satisfying... the principle of expressibility is indexical presentation of 
the object referred to. (Searle 1969: 88) 
 
On the other hand, Searle also speaks as if the contextual demonstration 
itself was a way of 'communicating', without making fully explicit, a sense 
that could be made fully explicit by replacing the demonstration by 
linguistic symbols. Since the pointing gesture is not part of the linguistic 
'expression' but part of the 'context', the ability to articulate the sense of the 
pointing gesture in words is part and parcel of what the Principle of 
Expressibility requires. Thus, a sentence such as 'The man (or: that man) is 
a foreigner' (accompanied by a glance or a pointing gesture) could be 
rephrased more explicitly as 'There is one and only one man on the 
speaker's left by the window in the field of vision of the speaker and the 
hearer, and he is a foreigner' (Searle 1969: 92). 
 Be that as it may, the Principle of Expressibility can and should be 
weakened so as not to entail that indexicality is eliminable. One way of 
doing so is to broaden the notion of 'sentence meaning' so as to admit 
among determinants of sentence meaning contextual assignments of 
semantic values to indexical expressions. Thus interpreted the principle of 
Expressibility is no longer equivalent to the Principle of Effability; it does 
not say that the content of the speech act can always be fully encoded into 
the linguistic meaning of a sentence type, but that it can be literally 
expressed by a sentence type 'with respect to context', where context 
consists of a time of utterance, a place of utterance, a speaker, a hearer, a 
sequence of demonstrated objects, etc. (That is the 'context' in the narrow 
sense in which formal semanticists use the notion.) 
 Thus weakened, the Principle of Expressibility is still incompatible 
with Searle's later findings about the background. What those findings 
show is that, however explicit the sentence, its linguistic meaning does not 
determine a set of truth conditions even 'with respect to context'. To 
account for the phenomena adduced by Searle in his later writings, we 
would have not only to relativize sentence-meaning to context but also to 
broaden the notion of context so as to include the total 'background'. If we 
broaden the notion of context that way, however, we fall back on the 
interpretation of the Principle of which I said that it is obviously not what 
Searle intended. An utterance is not explicit, by Searle's early standards, if 
it is an utterance of a vague or ambiguous sentence. But if the 'context', in 
the richest possible sense, is allowed to compensate for the lack of 
determinacy of the sentence, then even the utterance of a vague or 
ambiguous sentence will count as explicit. That is clearly not what Searle 
originally meant when he talked of an utterance being explicit (or not). 
 
VII. Local expressibility, global inexpressibility 
 
Let us go back to the passage in which Searle says that the Principle of 
Expressibility is compatible with background phenomena: 
 
There is nothing in the thesis of the relativity of literal meaning which 
is inconsistent with the Principle of Expressibility, the principle that 
whatever can be meant can be said. It is not part of, nor a consequence 
of, my argument for the relativity of literal meaning that there are 
meanings that are inherently inexpressible. (Searle 1979: 134) 
 
The last sentence suggests another possible weakening of the Principle of 
Expressibility. The principle could be understood as saying simply that 
whatever is meant can be made explicit. That entails that every background 
assumption relied upon in interpreting an utterance can be made explicit, 
but this is compatible with the fact that (i) they cannot be all be made 
explicit at the same time, and (ii) whenever we make one assumption 
explicit by adding more descriptive material, further background 
assumptions are implicitly called upon for the interpretation of that extra 
material. The Principle of Expressibility thus weakened becomes a 
Principle of Local Expressibility. In one passage in Speech Acts Searle 
seems to have had such a weak version in mind: 
 
Another application of this law [the Principle of Expressibility] is that 
whatever can be implied can be said, though if my account of 
preparatory conditions is correct, it cannot be said without implying 
other things. (Searle 1969: 68-69; emphasis mine) 
 
 Even that weakening is not satisfactory, however. The Principle of 
Expressibility, thus weakened, no longer supports the claim that "the study 
of sentence meanings and the study of speech acts are one and the same 
study". If expressibility can only be local, then a principle of global 
inexpressibility also holds, according to which what is said explicitly is 
always said against a background of unarticulated assumptions. That is 
sufficient to justify the contextualist claim that there is more to the content 
of a speech act than can be encoded into the meaning of a sentence. But 
Searle used the Principle of Expressibility precisely to argue against such a 
view. 
 Before concluding that Searle was mistaken when he said that the 
phenomenon of background-dependence does not refute the Principle of 
Expressibility, there is a last option that should be tried. I think it may well 
be what Searle had in mind. 
 
VIII. The generalization of background-dependence to all Intentional 
states 
 
Searle says that what is true of linguistic meaning is true of all Intentional 
states: thoughts, perceptions, intentions, etc. In all cases the Intentional 
content of the state determines satisfaction-conditions only relative to 
background assumptions which cannot be realized as further aspects of that 
content. If this is right, then there is a sense in which there may well be a 
perfect fit between the meaning of the sentence (which determines 
conditions of satisfaction only against a background of assumptions) and 
what the speaker means by uttering the sentence (since the speaker's 
meaning intentions themselves are background-relative in just the same 
way). In other words a sentence can be explicit, in the sense that it 
corresponds exactly to what the speaker means, without ceasing to under-
determine the conditions of satisfaction of the speech act. On that view the 
content of the speech act is the content of the sentence; both under-
determine the conditions of satisfaction. The Principle of Expressibility is 
therefore satisfied despite the phenomenon of background-dependence. 
Absolute explicitness is impossible since background-dependence is 
ineliminable, but relative explicitness can be achieved, consistently with 
the Principle of Expressibility. By 'relative' explicitness I mean a perfect fit 
between (i) the semantic content of the sentence, (ii) the content of the 
speech act performed by uttering the sentence, and (iii) the content of the 
Intentional states expressed by the utterance.4 Thus when I say 'The cat is 
on the mat', the literal meaning of the sentence (with respect to a contextual 
assignment of values to the incomplete descriptions 'the cat' and 'the mat') 
is the same thing as the content of the assertion that the cat is on the mat, 
and that is identical to the content of the expressed belief that the cat is on 
the mat. Background-dependence applies in all three cases; and it applies to 
the perception that the cat is on the mat as well: 
 
In my present experience I assume that I am perceiving the cat and the 
mat from a certain point of view where my body is located; I assume 
that these visual experiences are causally dependent on the state of 
affairs that I perceive; I assume that I am not standing on my head and 
seing cat and mat upside down, etc.; and all these assumptions are in 
addition to such general assumptions as that I am in a gravitional 
field, there are no wires attaching to cat and mat, etc. Now, the 
Intentionality of the visual experience will determine a set of 
conditions of satisfaction. But the purely visual aspects of the 
experience will produce a set of conditions of satisfaction only against 
a set of background assumptions which are not themselves part of the 
visual experience... In this case as in the literal meaning case, the 
Intentionality of the visual perception only has an application, only 
determines a set of conditions of satisfaction, against some system of 
background assumptions. (Searle 1979: 136) 
 
 To sum up: what one literally says depends upon the Background, 
but what one believes and what one perceives also depend upon the 
Background. In all cases the content of the representation — be it linguistic 
or mental — only determines conditions of satisfaction against a 
background of unarticulated assumptions. The question, whether the beliefs 
one communicates can be exactly expressed by the sentences one utters, 
can therefore be answered affirmatively, in accord with the Principle of 
                                           
4 As far as (ii) and (iii) are concerned, Searle points out that, in virtue of the theory of 
speech acts, the content of the speech act always corresponds to the content of the 
Intentional state it expresses. 
Expressibility, even though the uttered sentence can't be fully explicit in 
the absolute sense. 
 That view, which it is reasonable to ascribe to Searle, stands in sharp 
contrast to an alternative position, deriving from Wittgenstein. The 
alternative position sets linguistic meaning apart from Intentional states: It 
says that words are special in being inert and (as Searle himself insists) 
devoid of 'intrinsic Intentionality'. What gives them 'life' is the use that is 
made of them. There is no such thing for Intentional contents. In contrast to 
words and sentences, thoughts and concepts are not 'tools', and they are not 
'used'. Accordingly they lack the semantic indeterminacy which 
characterizes sentences and linguistic material generally. While sentences 
are semantically indeterminate except in the context of a speech act,5 
thoughts are semantically determinate. Hence it is a category mistake to 
generalize, as Searle does, the sort of contextual dependency exhibited by 
linguistic meaning to Intentional states in general. 
 In the remainder of this paper, I will, first, scrutinize the view I have 
(tentatively) ascribed to Searle: that which generalizes the phenomenon of 
background-dependence to all Intentional states and is thereby able to 
protect the Principle of Expressibility. I will show that the attempted 
generalization fails. I will then elaborate the Wittgensteinian position and 
show that it can accommodate the phenomena adduced by Searle in his 
critique of the Determination View. 
 
IX. Literal meaning vs. Intentional content 
 
Searle's view rests on the following equation: 
                                           
5 According to James Conant, this Wittgensteinian principle is a generalization of 
Frege's celebrated Context principle: "[Wittgenstein] seeks to genralize Frege's context-
principle so that it applies not only to words (and their role within the context of a 
significant proposition) but to sentences (and their role within the context of 
circumstances of significant use)" (Conant 1998: 233). 
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Table 2 
 
If that equation could be maintained, it would indeed be possible to 
conciliate the Principle of Expressibility and the phenomenon of 
background-dependence. But I do not think the equation can be 
maintained, for the following reason. 
 Even if 'sentence meaning' is understood as the meaning of the 
sentence with respect to contextual assignments of values to indexicals, it 
is still much more indeterminate, much more susceptible to background 
phenomena, than the content of the speech act or the content of the 
expressed psychological state. There is this basic difference between the 
two sorts of case: If we change the background while keeping the meaning 
of the sentence constant, we change the truth conditions — that is what 
Searle's examples show; but we simply cannot, by manipulating the 
background, change the conditions of satisfaction of the speech act or of 
the Intentional state while leaving its content unchanged. The content of 
the speech act (or of the Intentional state) lacks the form of 'indeterminacy' 
which the meaning of the sentence possesses, and which makes it possible 
to keep it constant while varying the conditions of satisfaction. 
 Searle's formulations are misleading in that respect. For he 
repeatedly says that the content of a speech act, or the content of an 
Intentional state, only determines conditions of satisfaction against a 
background of unarticulated assumptions, just as the meaning of the 
sentence only determines conditions of satisfaction against the 
Background. But in the case of speech acts and Intentional states, the 
relevant 'contents' are not separable from the conditions of satisfaction they 
determine. The order to cut the grass is not the same order when 'cut' is 
understood as 'slice' and when it is understood as 'mow'. That is so because 
you can't change the conditions of satisfaction (by manipulating the 
background) without eo ipso changing the content and therefore (since the 
act/state is individuated in part by its content) without changing the state or 
the act itself. 
 The inseparability of content from conditions of satisfaction shows 
up everywhere in Searle's writings. Here are a few quotations from 
Intentionality: 
 
An Intentional state only determines its conditions of satisfaction — 
and thus only is the state that it is — given its position in a Network of 
other Intentional states and against a Background of practices and 
preintentional assumptions that are neither themselves Intentional 
states nor are they parts of the conditions of satisfaction of Intentional 
states. (Searle 1983: 19) 
 
The Intentional content which determines the conditions of 
satisfaction is internal to the Intentional state: there is no way the 
agent can have a belief or a desire without it having its conditions of 
satisfaction. (Searle 1983: 22) 
 
Intentional contents in general and experiences in particular are 
internally related in a holistic way to other Intentional contents (the 
Network) and to nonrepresentational capacities (the Background). 
They are internally related in the sense that they could not have the 
conditions of satisfaction that they do except in relation to the rest of 
the Network and the Background. (Searle 1983: 66) 
 
Intentional states only have the conditions of satisfaction that they do, 
and thus only are the states that they are, against a Background of 
abilities that are not themselves Intentional states. (Searle 1983: 143) 
 
The following passage is particularly interesting: 
 
It would... be incorrect to think of the Background as forming a bridge 
between Intentional content and the determination of conditions of 
satisfaction, as if the Intentional content itself could not reach up to 
the conditions of satisfaction. (Searle 1983: 158) 
 
What is interesting here is the contrast with literal meaning. For in the case 
of literal meaning, there is a clear sense in which the meaning of the 
sentence itself 'does not reach up to the conditions of satisfaction'. Searle 
says so in many places. For example: "If somebody instructs me to cut the 
sand, I do not know what I am supposed to do. For each [such] case ['cut 
the sand', 'cut the mountain', etc.] I can imagine a context in which I would 
be able to determine a set of truth conditions; but by themselves, without 
the addition of a context, the sentences do not do that." (Searle 1980: 225-
6.) The sentence, with its meaning, can easily be separated from the 
conditions of satisfaction which, in context, it determines. No so with 
Intentional states (or speech acts) and their contents. 
 In general, to convince ourselves that the above equation can't be 
maintained, there is a very simple procedure: one has only to consider what 
happens if we replace 'sentence' by 'Intentional state' (or 'speech act') and 
'literal meaning' by 'content' in one of the numerous passages in which 
Searle describes the under-determination of truth conditions by literal 
meaning. The results are instructing. Here is one example: 
 
Original passage 
The literal meaning of a sentence or expression only determines a set 
of truth conditions given a set of background assumptions and 
practices. Given one set of these a sentence or expression may 
determine one set of truth conditions and given another set of 
assumptions and practices the same sentence or expression with the 
same meaning can determine a different set of truth conditions. 
(Searle 1980: 227) 
 
Same passage after substitution: 
The content of a speech act or Intentional state only determines a set 
of truth conditions given a set of background assumptions and 
practices. Given one set of these a speech act or Intentional state may 
determine one set of truth conditions and given another set of 
assumptions and practices the same speech act or Intentional state 
with the same content can determine a different set of truth conditions. 
 
In view of the inseparability thesis, the claim that 'the same speech act or 
Intentional state with the same content can determine different sets of truth 
conditions' is nonsense. Again, if you change the conditions of satisfaction, 
the content does not stay constant. So the content of the speech act or 
Intentional state does not play the same role, and does not have the same 
properties, as the meaning of the sentence; for it is crucial to Searle's 
argument in 'Literal meaning' and elsewhere that the meaning of the 
sentence stays constant when the truth conditions are made to vary by 
manipulating the background. 
 
X. Literal meaning, sensory content, and the brain 
 
When he stresses the analogy between literal meaning and Intentional 
content, Searle often appeals to the example of perception. The following 
passage is characteristic: 
 
All of the arguments for the context dependency of the sentences "Bill 
cut the grass" , "4 + 5 = 9" and "Snow is white" are also arguments for 
the context dependency of the beliefs that Bill cut the grass, that 4 + 5 
= 9 and that snow is white. The content of those beliefs determines the 
conditions of satisfaction that they do determine only against a 
background. "Well", we might imagine our objector saying, "if so that 
is because those beliefs would naturally come to us in words. But how 
about worldless Intentional states, and how about the primary form of 
Intentionality, perception?" If anything the contextual dependency of 
perceptual contents is even or more striking [sic] than the contextual 
dependency of semantic contents. Suppose I am standing in front of a 
house looking at it; in so doing I will have a certain visual experience 
with a certain Intentional content, i.e. certain conditions of 
satisfaction; but suppose now as part of the background assumptions I 
assume I am on a Hollywood movie set and all of the buildings are 
just papier maché façades. This assumption would not only give us 
different conditions of satisfaction; it would even alter the way the 
façade of the house looks to us, in the same way that the sentence 
"Cut the grass!" would be interpreted differently if we thought that the 
background was such that we were supposed to slice the grass rather 
than mow it. (Searle 1980: 231) 
 
Perception indeed supports the analogy to some extent. Even in that case, 
however, Searle acknowledges that the content of the visual experience 
changes when the background is altered: 
 
It is part of the content of my visual experience when I look at a whole 
house that I expect the rest of the house to be there if, for example, I 
enter the house or go around to the back. In these sorts of cases the 
character of the visual experience and its conditions of satisfaction 
will be affected by the content of the beliefs that one has about the 
perceptual situation. I am not going beyond the content of my visual 
experience when I say, "I see a house" instead of "I see the façade of a 
house", for, though the optical stimuli may be the same, the conditions 
of satisfaction in the former case are that there should be a whole 
house there. (Searle 1983: 54-55) 
 
 If the content of the visual experience changes when the conditions 
of satisfaction are manipulated by altering the background, is there 
something that stays constant and can be compared to the constant meaning 
of the sentence? Searle names two candidates: 'the purely visual aspects of 
the experience' and 'the optical stimuli'. Now the optical stimuli are not a 
good candidate. To use a contrast made famous by John McDowell (1984: 
103n), they may be a bearer of content, but they are not an aspect of 
content. What we need, for the analogy with literal meaning to hold, is an 
aspect of semantic content that stays invariant when background 
assumptions are manipulated. The 'purely visual aspects of the experience' 
seem to fit the bill. It is common to distinguish two forms of, or two levels 
in, perception. Cognitive perception is higher-level perception, and it 
presupposes a lower level of sensory perception. Sensory perception is 
modular and unaffected by background knowledge; cognitive perception, is 
nonmodular and background-dependent (see e.g. Dretske 1990: 138-146). 
If the distinction is sound, the content of sensory perception corresponds to 
what Searle calls the 'purely visual aspects of the experience', and that is 
indeed analogous to the linguistic meaning of the sentence. 
 The problem is that the distinction between the aspects of visual 
content which are modular and those which are cognitive and background-
dependent cannot be generalized to all Intentional states. There is no such 
contrast for beliefs, desires or intentions. Nor is there such a contrast for 
thought in general. The distinction seems to be limited to perceptual states 
and processes. It is indeed similar to the distinction we find in the language 
case, but that similarity itself does not provide an explanation of the 
phenomenon of background-dependence in the language case; it rather 
constitutes a further fact in need of explanation (a fact which I will leave 
aside in this chapter). 
 Searle mentions a third candidate for the analogy with literal 
meaning; a candidate that has the relevant degree of generality. The neural 
configuration in the brain which realizes a given Intentional state can stay 
constant even though we radically alter the Background. For example, take 
Carter's desire to run for the Presidency of the US and the corresponding 
neural configuration in Carter's brain. We can suppose that "exactly these 
same type-identical realizations of the mental state occurred in the mind 
and brain of a Pleistocene man living in a hunter-gatherer society of 
thousands of years ago" (Searle 1983: 20). Because of the dependence of 
Intentional contents on Network and Background, "however type-identical 
the two realizations might be, the Pleistocene man's mental state could not 
have been the desire to run for the Presidency of the United States" (id.). 
Granted. It is well known that content, in general, is not an intrinsic but a 
relational property of the content-bearing state. That is the lesson of 
Externalism. Had the environment been sufficiently different, the same 
neural state which realizes a given Intentional content would realize a 
different content (or no content at all). But this is not the same 
phenomenon as background-dependence. The neural state which realizes a 
given Intentional content is not an aspect or level of content; it is, again, a 
vehicle, a bearer of content. As such it is analogous to the sentence qua 
syntactic object, rather than to the linguistic meaning of the sentence. What 
corresponds to Externalism in the linguistic case is therefore the fact that 
the sentence (type) could mean something different from what it actually 
means: it would do so if the conventions of the language had been 
different. This has nothing to do with the under-determination of semantic 
content (given a fixed linguistic meaning). Similarly, the fact that a neural 
state realizes a given Intentional content only in a certain context does not 
show that in thought, as in language, there is a level of content that under-
determines conditions of satisfaction. 
 I conclude that the analogy between the background-dependence of 
Intentional content and the background-dependence of semantic content 
breaks down at crucial points and does not, as it stands, provide an 
explanation for the facts adduced by Searle in his critique of the 
Determination View. I therefore suggest that, getting rid of the Principle of 
Expressibility, we turn to the contextualist approach and see what can be 
done within that framework. 
 
XI. A contextualist perspective 
 
The account of the phenomenon of background-dependence I am about to 
provide takes its inspiration from Austin's theory of truth (cf. the paper 
'Truth' in Austin 1971) and, above all, from the remarks of Waismann 
(1951) on the open texture of empirical predicates; which remarks 
themselves presumably echo Wittgenstein's views (see, in particular, 
sections §§66sq. of Philosophical Investigations). The central idea is that 
words are not primitively associated with abstract 'conditions of 
application', constituting their conventional meaning (as on the Fregean 
picture). Rather, they are associated with particular applications. 
 Consider what it is to learn a predicate P. The learner, who I'll call 
Tom, observes the application of P in a particular situation S; he associates 
P and S. At this stage, the 'meaning' — or, as I prefer to say, semantic 
potential — of P for Tom is the fact that P is applicable to S. In a new 
situation S', Tom will judge that P applies only if he finds that S' 
sufficiently resembles S. To be sure, it is possible that S' resembles S in a 
way which is not pertinent for the application of P. The application of P to 
S' will then be judged faulty by the community, who will correct Tom. The 
learning phase for Tom consists in noting a sufficient number of situations 
which, like S, legitimate the application of P, as opposed to those, like S', 
which do not legitimate it. The semantic potential of P for Tom at the end 
of his learning phase can thus be thought of as a collection of legitimate 
situations of application; that is, a collection of situations such that the 
members of the community agree that P applies to those situations. Let's 
call the situations in question source-situations. The future applications of 
P will be underpinned, in Tom's usage, by the judgement that the situation 
of application (or target-situation) is similar to the source-situations. 
 In this theory the semantic potential of P is a collection of source-
situations, and the conditions of application of P in a given use, involving a 
given target-situation S'', are a set of features which S'' must possess to be 
similar to the source-situations. The set of features in question, and so the 
conditions of application for P, will not be the same for all uses; it is going 
to depend, amongst other things, on the target-situation. One target-
situation can be similar to the source-situations in certain respects and 
another target-situation can be similar to them in different respects. But the 
contextual variability of the conditions of application does not end there. 
Even once the target-situation is fixed, the relevant dimensions for 
evaluating the similarity between that situation and the source-situations 
remain under-determined: those dimensions will vary as a function of the 
subject of conversation, the concerns of the speech participants, etc. 
 One particularly important factor in the contextual variation is the 
relevant 'contrast set'. As Tversky (1977) has pointed out, judgements of 
similarity are very much affected by variations along that dimension. If we 
ask which country, Sweden or Hungary, most resembles Austria (without 
specifying the relevant dimension of similarity), the answer will depend on 
the set of countries considered. If that set includes not just Sweden, 
Hungary and Austria but also Poland, then Sweden will be judged more 
like Austria than Hungary; but if the last of the four countries considered is 
Norway and not Poland, then it is Hungary which will be judged more like 
Austria than Sweden. The explanation for that fact is simple. Poland and 
Hungary have certain salient geopolitical features in common which can 
serve as basis for the classification: Hungary and Poland are then put 
together and opposed to Austria and Sweden. If we replace Poland by 
Norway in the contrast set a new principle of classification emerges, based 
on the salient features shared by Norway and Sweden: in this new 
classification Hungary and Austria are back together. Tversky concludes 
that judgements of similarity appeal to features having a high 'diagnostic 
value' (or classificatory significance), and that the diagnostic value of 
features itself depends on the available contrast set. 
 
XII. Accounting for background-dependence 
 
Within that simple contextualist framework, let us reconsider the 
phenomenon of background-dependence. It goes along with the global 
character of the similarity between target-situation and source-situations. 
The source-situations are concrete situations with an indefinite number of 
features. Some of these features are ubiquitous and their diagnostic value in 
a normal situation is vanishing.6 They belong to the most general and 
immutable aspects of our experience of the world: gravity, the fact that 
food is ingested via the mouth, etc. When we specify the truth conditions 
of a sentence (for example the sentence 'The cat is on the mat'), or the 
conditions of application of a predicate (for example the predicate 'on' in 
that sentence), we only mention a small number of features — the 
'foreground' features — because we take most of the others for granted; so 
we do not mention gravity, we presuppose it. Nevertheless, gravity is one 
of the features possessed by the situations which are at the source of the 
predicate 'on'; and there is an indefinite number of such features. These 
background features of the source-situations can be ignored inasmuch as 
                                           
6 Cf. Tversky 1977: 342: "The feature 'real' has no diagnostic value in the set of actual 
animals since it is shared by all actual animals and hence cannot be used to classify 
them. This feature, however, aquires considerable diagnostic value if the object set is 
extended to include legendary animals, such as a centaur, a mermaid or a phoenix." 
they are shared by the situations of which we can want to speak when we 
utter the sentence; but if we imagine a target-situation where the normal 
conditions of experience are suspended, and where certain background 
features of the source-situations are not present, then we shatter the global 
similarity between the target-situation and the source-situations. Even if the 
target-situation has all the foreground features which seem to enter into 
the 'definition' of a predicate P, it suffices to suspend a certain number of 
background features in order to jeopard the application of P to the target-
situation. That shows that the semantic potential of P is not, as in Fregean 
semantics, a set of conditions of application determined once and for all, 
but a collection of source-situations such that P applies to a target-situation 
if and only if it is relevantly similar to the source-situations. 
 A caveat: as Searle himself emphasizes, the fact that the target-
situation does not possess certain background features of the source-
situations does not automatically entail the non-applicability of the 
predicate P. It can be that the background features which the target-
situation does not possess (for example gravity) are contextually irrelevant 
and do not affect the application conditions of the predicate. For the same 
sort of reason, the possession by the target-situation of what I have called 
the foreground features of the source-situations is no more a necessary 
condition for the application of the predicate than it is a sufficient 
condition. For a predicate (or a sentence) to apply to a target-situation that 
situation must resemble the source-situations under the contextually 
relevant aspects. So a predicate can apply even if the target-situation differs 
markedly from the source-situations, as long as, in the context and taking 
into account the contrast set, the similarities are more significant than the 
differences. Thus, in certain contexts, the predicate 'lemon' will apply to 
plastic lemons, or the word 'water' to XYZ. Putnam himself, in 'The 
Meaning of Meaning', recognizes the legitimacy of such uses, made 
possible by the contextual variability of the relevant dimensions of 
similarity (Putnam 1975: 238-9). 
 
XIII. Conclusion 
 
I take the phenomenon of background-dependence to reveal quite 
fundamental features of natural language. Searle must be credited for 
having drawn attention to that phenomenon and for having appreciated its 
importance. I have criticized Searle's explanation of the phenomenon, 
however. According to Searle, the under-determination of semantic content 
is a special case of a more general phenomenon which affects all 
representations, whether linguistic or mental. To determine whether or not 
a representation is 'satisfied', that representation must be interpreted. Searle 
cites the Wittgensteinian example of an image showing a man climbing a 
slope: the man could just as well be seen as going backwards down the 
slope — the image itself does not tell us which interpretation is right 
(Searle 1992: 177). For Searle, the under-determination of satisfaction-
conditions derives from the fact that representations, whether linguistic or 
mental, are not 'self-interpretive' or 'self-applicative'. From that follows the 
non-representational character of the Background which bridges the gap 
between the representation and its application. To add a second 
representation to the first in order to interpret it does no more than 
postpone the problem, for the second representation would also need 
interpreting. Ultimately, a representation can only be applied if it is 
inserted in a nonrepresentational milieu — if it plays a role in a practice. 
Whence Searle's insistence on the fact that the Background consists largely 
in behavioural dispositions and know-how. "Intentionality occurs in a 
coordinated flow of action and perception, and the Background is the 
condition of possibility of the forms taken by the flow" (Searle 1992: 195). 
What we assume we assume in virtue of the way we act and navigate 
through the world. We assume gravity, the solidity of objects, and the 
existence of other minds, in virtue of the way we act; we do not, or need 
not, entertain thoughts about these things. 
 I take Searle to be right both concerning the need for interpretation 
and the importance of the 'practical' dimension of cognition. But I doubt 
the two things are related in the way Searle makes them appear to be. 
Moreover, I do not think we can simply invoke the non-self-interpretive (or 
non-self-applicative) character of representations; we must explain it. Why 
do the representations conveyed by words only apply to the world via a 
process of interpretation? Why aren't they self-applicative? They ought to 
be, if linguistic meaning conformed to the Fregean image, that is, if it 
consisted in conditions of application. If, in virtue of the conventions of the 
language, a predicate P possesses definite conditions of application, as the 
Fregean thinks it does, then either the reality of which we speak satisfies 
those conditions and the predicate applies, or it does not satisfy them and 
the predicate does not apply. I grant the non-self-applicative character of 
linguistic representations as an empirical datum, attested by Searle's 
examples, but to give an account of that feature an alternative must be 
proposed to the traditional view of meaning inherited from Frege. In 
section XI, I sketched such an alternative. 
 Searle's generalization of background-dependence to all Intentional 
states enables him to save the Principle of Expressibility which is the heart 
of his earlier theory of speech acts. That move I do not find very 
convincing, for I have always been struck by the tension between the 
earlier philosophy, based on the Principle of Expressibility, and the later 
views which pull in the opposite direction. Be that as it may, I have shown 
that the attempted generalization fails. It follows that the Principle of 
Expressibility cannot be saved. More important, we are left without an 
explanation of the phenomenon of background-dependence. Where does it 
come from? 
 Impressed by the similarity between Searle's background-
dependence and Waismann's 'open texture', I have offered a contextualist 
account of background-dependence. On this view the content or sense of 
words — their contributions to the truth conditions of utterances — must 
be contextually constructed in an active process of interpretation; it is not 
ready-made. What is given as part of the language is not the sense of 
words, which must be constructed, but only what I have called their 
semantic potential. To construct the (context-dependent) sense of a word 
out its (context-independent) semantic potential, nothing short of the full 
situation of utterance will do. An impoverished 'context' consisting only of 
values for a given set of parameters does not provide the sort of input 
which is needed for the process of sense construction to get off the ground; 
for that process relies on a global assessment of similarity between 
situations possessing, in principle, an indefinite number of features. 
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